Abstract-Performing delegation in large scale, dynamic and distributed environments with large numbers of shared resources is more challenging than inside local administrative domains. In dynamic environments like Grids, on one hand, delegating a restricted set of rights reduces exposure to attack but also limits the flexibility and dynamism of the application; on the other hand, delegating all rights provides maximum flexibility but increases exposure. This issue has not yet been adequately addressed by current Grid security mechanisms and is becoming a very challenging and crucial issue for future Grid development. Therefore, providing an effective delegation mechanism which meets the requirements of the least privilege principle is becoming an essential need. Furthermore, we are witnessing a phenomenal increase in the automation of organizational tasks and decision making, as well as the computerization of information related services, requiring automated delegation mechanisms. In order to meet these requirements we introduce an Active Delegation Framework which extends our previous work on on-demand delegation, making it context-aware. The framework provides a just-in-time, restricted and dynamic delegation mechanism for Grids. In this paper we describe the development of this framework and its implementation and integration with the Globus Toolkit.
I. INTRODUCTION
The long-term future of the Grid will be to provide dynamic aggregations of resources, provided as services between businesses, which can be exploited by end-users and application developers to solve complex, multi-faceted problems across virtual organizations and business communities. To fulfill this vision, we need architectures and detailed mechanisms for bringing together arbitrary Grid-based resources, along with other resources such as conventional web-services, webbased information sources and people, in a highly dynamic yet manageable way. However, today's Grid architectures are not capable of supporting dynamic, agile federation across multiple administrative domains and the main barrier, which hinders dynamic and secure federation over short time-scales, is security.
Delegation is a powerful means to support expanding and propagating trust relationships in Grids. Jobs running on remote sites use delegated rights for accessing resources on behalf of their owners. Supporting this capability in a reliable, secure, and functional manner requires that we address the challenges of restricted and dynamic delegation.
In this context we need to meet the requirements of the least privilege principle, stating that we should grant only those rights required to perform a required action to minimize exposure to misuse. Unrestricted delegation, even in a highly confined and uniformly controlled environment, creates security risks. In widely-distributed environments such as Grids, there is greater possibility of losing trustworthiness by some irregular actions (for example, system compromise by an outside attacker).
However, as we have described in our earlier work [1] , performing delegation in a restricted but static fashion may cause task execution to fail due to insufficient delegated rights, because the required rights are difficult to predict in advance for dynamic Grid environments, where the resources used by the task may be chosen at run-time based on availability, cost, performance, and other concerns. Agile and automated delegation requires embedding delegation functionality in services. Delegation functionality can be provided by the container that hosts the service [2] . This kind of delegation service is becoming an essential security component in many distributed security infrastructures [3] [4] .
All the above mentioned requirements led us to recognize the need for a new model of delegation to be used by current Grid systems-a framework which supports a context-aware, restricted, dynamic and automated delegation for Grids. In this paper we describe the development of this framework which approaches a just-in-time delegation to enable delegating rights and privileges to potential Delegatees as required for completing tasks.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we describe the Active Delegation Framework as our approach to meeting the requirements described earlier. This section also describes the architecture of this framework for a generic Grid infrastructure. Section III describes the architectural components of the active delegation framework in a real Grid system. In this section through a real Grid scenario we illustrate the practicability of our approach and describe how the components of the framework are implemented and can be integrated into a real Grid infrastructure. In section IV, we discuss related works. Section V gives a discussion on our approach from different aspects such as scalability, security and performance. Finally, in section VI we conclude and describe future works.
II. ACTIVE DELEGATION FRAMEWORK
We introduce an active delegation framework for Grids, in which a restricted, dynamic and automated delegation can be supported. This provides a context-based and on-demand delegation paradigm which enables a just-in-time acquisition of delegated rights in an associated context. Throughout this approach, when a delegated task is being completed, the Delegatee requests required rights from the Delegator and if the request is approved, in an associated context, the rights will be provided to the Delegatee. This implies delegating rights iteratively as needed until the task has completed. This also addresses the requirements of the least privilege principle, as no right through the delegation is given to a Delegatee unless it is needed and the "need" can be approved.
We elaborate upon our approach by describing a simple scenario. When the Delegatee initiates execution of a delegated task it may only obtain a minimal set of rights which allows it to prove that it needs to act on behalf of its Delegator. The Delegatee has no additional rights to access resources and therefore needs to obtain them later when they are required in order to proceed to task completion. Thus, when required privileges are determined, the Delegatee contacts the Delegation Service and requests the required rights. The Delegation Service receives the request and consults a policy engine to check the request against the delegation policies established by the Delegator. The policies can be fulfilled only if the context in which additional delegated rights are requested has been established. Thus, if the request fulfills the circumstances, the Delegation Service generates appropriate credentials with embedded rights and sends them back to the Delegatee. The Delegatee can therefore continue its execution.
Central to this approach are both: a mechanism which enables "on-demand" requesting and provisioning of delegated credentials and a way of establishing "contexts" in which the need for additional delegated rights can be verified. By utilizing a call-back mechanism the Delegatee would be able to make a request for the required rights "on-demand" and also allows the Delegator to provide them just-in-time. Monitoring, collecting and processing the status of jobs, resources and service can also be used for establishing "contexts". Contexts can evolve through the task life-cycle and can be considered as any characterizing information about protected resources and surrounding environments in Grids. Contexts are basically associated to: a) resources to be controlled, b) Delegatees who make requests to access protected resources and c) Delegators whom on their behalf access to resources is being made.
The approach of the active delegation model is designed to address the requirements of active security systems. The idea of active security models was preliminary presented in [5] as a security model which distinguishes from a passive security model by introducing contexts in which permissions can be activated and primarily serves the function of maintaining permission assignment. In active security systems any assigned permission might be activated or deactivated when its associated context is evolving, and operations are then permitted if the associated permission is currently activated. In order to address the needs for providing active security models, some access control models have been introduced to enable distinguishing between permission assignment and activation by considering different levels of context when processing an access operation on an object [6] [7] [8] .
The work presented in this paper is the continuation of our previous work in the context of Grid delegation mechanisms presented in [1] : a so-called "on-demand" delegation mechanism which is an efficient, scalable and manageable approach to provide a restricted and flexible delegation framework for Grids. The main contribution of this work is adding sufficient support to the on-demand delegation framework to make it capable of asserting the "need" for requested delegation rights. To achieve this, the main effort has been moving toward an active delegation model described earlier by introducing "contexts" in the on-demand delegation framework. Furthermore this paper also gives a full description of architectural components and implementation details of our developed active delegation model.
A. Architectural components
In this section, we decouple the framework described earlier into its architectural components. We also explain how these components are related and should interact with each other. What Figure 1 illustrates are the components of the active delegation model (gray boxes) in a generic Grid infrastructure. Those generic architectural components (white boxes) illustrated in this picture can be provided by many currently used Grid systems. Later in this paper, when we explain the development of the active delegation framework, we describe how the components with generic names are replaced by the real components in a widely used Grid infrastructure. The components of the active delegation framework are the following:
1) Delegation Service: The Delegation Service is a web service for delegating credentials to potential requesters (Delegatees) that can be run by a user or hosted on behalf of many users. Delegation Services can delegate credentials based on a given delegation specification attached to the request. Along with the request, the Delegation Service requires the context information in which additional delegated rights are requested. The Delegation Service must also query the policy engine to check if delegation policies can be fulfilled in a particular context and delegating additional rights is therefore permitted.
2) Context Manager: The Context Manager is a service which is either notified by other services with new context information or makes a query to directly obtain the context information of particular services, resources or job instances. This context information along with the delegation request are then sent to the Delegation Service to make the appropriate context in which a delegation request needs to be verified. The Context Manager might collect a variety of information, such as a decision made by the scheduler on where to run a job or the closest replica of a database which contains the input data as selected by a Replica Location Service. Furthermore, context information might be created to verify a delegation request which is made to obtain additional rights for the subjobs created from a parent job. The Context Manager would typically be hosted with the services it obtains information from.
3) Policy Engine: A policy framework is required to set up delegation policies. As part of this framework there is a Policy Engine which can be used by the Delegation Service to check a delegation request against the set of established delegation policies. Delegation polices are established either by the local administrator or the Delegator herself, based on templates provided for common use cases. Therefore, in addition to the "context" in which delegating rights is permitted, the Delegator and local administrator can also impose their own policies before delegating rights to the Delegatee.
4) Credential Exchanging Protocol:
The on-demand delegation framework requires a protocol for requesting and receiving delegation credentials as needed. The callback mechanism leveraged by this framework requires a flexible and efficient protocol that enables exchanging different security credential formats between the Delegatee and the Delegation Service dynamically over heterogeneous security domains.
5) Collection of Information:
Depending on what services are called or which resources are being used, the Context Manager may be required to leverage different ways of communication and information collection. The Context Manager further needs to convert collected information into a single internal format for processing.
III. A GRID USE-CASE
In this section, we first describe the development of the active delegation model by thoroughly illustrating its design and implementation into a Grid system. We describe also a Grid scenario in which the potential benefits of active delegation can be illustrated. Although the design of this framework can support more advanced scenarios, in this section for the sake of simplicity and to avoid illustrating complex policy schema we only focus on a simple Grid job submission. Figure 2 depicts the design of the active delegation framework into a Globus 1 GT4 environment. It illustrates the instances of the more generic architectural components and communication protocols described in section II-A. This figure also depicts the flow of information and the sequence of events which we will further describe in section III-B. 
A. Design and Implementation

1) Rei Policy language:
Rei is a policy framework that we use for reasoning over delegation policies [9] [10] . It has strong potential to meet the requirements of the active delegation framework. The Rei policy framework permits specifying, analyzing and reasoning over declarative policies defined as norms of behavior [11] [9] . Rei has been aimed at leveraging the potential of Semantic Web and ontologies in describing security requirements and specifying security policies. In our earlier work [1] , we also showed a strong potential of ontologies and Semantic Web in development of an on-demand delegation framework. Rei policies restrict domain actions that an entity can/must perform on resources in the environment, allowing policies to be deployed as contextually constrained deontic concepts, i.e., permission, prohibition, obligation and dispensation.
In the Rei policy specification 2 , context conditions can be specified by defining one or more constraints. A constraint, which may be simple or Boolean, i.e., the boolean combination of a pair of simple constraints, defines a set of actors or a set of actions that fulfill a certain property. Rei's support for contexts makes it well-suited for our purposes, though evaluation of other policy languages is planned for future work.
The class Action is one of the most important concepts in the Rei specifications as policies are described over possible actions in the domain. Rei includes a representation of actions that allows more contextual information to be captured. Action has two main subclasses: DomainAction and SpeechAct.
More important to our framework are the SpeechActs. The SpeechActs are primarily used for dynamic and remote policy management. There are six subclasses of SpeechAct: Delegate, Revoke, Request, Cancel, Command, and Promise. One property encompassed by SpeechAct is condition which states the constraints that the sender is adding to any SpeechAct. That is, the speech act is only valid when these constraints are true. An entity can "request" another entity for a permission, which if accepted causes a "delegation" to be performed. Delegation of a SpeechAct can also lead to a new permission.
In order to use Rei we have extended SpeechAct delegation by incorporating a new property called pre-condition, which is defined as the conditions that need to be true before the delegation speech act can be performed. These pre-conditions are in fact constructing the "context" in which delegation can be activated and a delegation speech act can be triggered in response to a request. We need to recognize the distinction between the pre-condition property and the condition property defined originally in the Rei specification. The pre-condition determines when rights may be delegated, while the condition determines when rights may be used. Grid tasks can take longer than the validity interval of a context for which delegation is activated, which implies that constraints that must be satisfied before delegating rights should not necessarily remain true to make the delegated rights usable.
As a motivating example, assume that a Delegation Service recognized the need for performing a delegation for enabling access to a database because the first targeted database is unavailable; after performing the delegation administrators may fix the problem and make the service available again. This makes a new context in which the previous delegation would no longer be valid, but the active task should be able to complete its session with the backup database. Using a "precondition" can enable this use case.
2) GrDP credential exchanging protocol: The Grid Delegation Protocol (GrDP) introduced in [2] provides a protocol for requesting and exchanging delegation credentials in a flexible fashion independent of underlying security mechanisms. The design of GrDP is based on the WS-Trust specification [12] which provides security mechanism independence, enabling the exchange of many kinds of security tokens in common use in Grid environments.
3) Delegation service: The Delegation Service used in this framework is a token service that delegates credentials according to the delegation specification. This token service supports a WS-Trust interface for requesting those security tokens profiled by OASIS, such as SAML and X.509 certificates. The GrDP and Delegation service together provide a flexible mechanism to support an on-demand delegation.
4) Gridway system: GridWay 3 is a light-weight metascheduler that performs job execution management and resource brokering. GridWay is specifically designed to work on top of Globus services. It allows unattended, reliable, and efficient execution of jobs, array jobs, or complex jobs on 3 http://www.gridway.org/ heterogeneous, dynamic and loosely-coupled Grids. GridWay performs all the job scheduling and submission steps transparently to the end user and adapts job execution to changing Grid conditions by providing fault recovery mechanisms, dynamic scheduling, migration on-request and opportunistic migration.
5) Context manager:
The Context Manager can collect appropriate information from the resources and jobs. The context manager may also be configured to be notified by other services when the status of resources or jobs has changed. It can use a standard interface (WS-Notification). If there is no notification support, the service can make a direct query to get the status of job or resources. Context information is then constructed in the format of "Constraints" used in the Rei policy format to be used by the policy engine for asserting a request. The context information can be obtained either from the GridWay service or the built-in GT4 services, like MDS (Monitoring & Discovery System) and WS-GRAM. The development of the Context Manager is currently tied to the GT4 services and can construct only simple context information. The context information when collected, enriched and converted to Rei constraints is signed by the Context Manager for the assertion of delegation policies. The Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the components and the interactions of the active delegation model only for executing jobs on a single site. However, a job running on the Grid may need to visit different sites when completing tasks. Figure 3 roughly describes how the active delegation model is used in a scenario which involves more than one site to execute a job. As it is depicted in this figure, when a job migrates from Site1 to Site2 for completing a task execution, upon requiring additional rights, the execution service of Site2 needs to make a delegation request to the Delegation Service running on the job's home site (Site1). The context required for verifying the delegation request, should also be requested by the Site1 Delegation Service from the Context Manager of Site2 .
We have developed a proof-of-concept implementation over the Globus GT4 environment for the components described earlier. An implementation of the GrDP is used for requesting and exchanging credentials between jobs and delegation services. This implementation profiles the WS-Trust specification for SAML assertions, X.509 certificates and proxy certificates.
It also implements the GSI delegation mechanism for proxy certificates. The current implementation of the Delegation Service generates an independent proxy with an embedded SAML assertion which contains appropriate authorization statements for accessing resources. The current implementation of the Context Manager only supports simple scenarios and can be used to generate very simple contexts. It uses the "gwps" and "gwhost" system monitoring commands provided by the Gridway system to gather information about jobs and resources.
B. Scenario
We now describe a scenario to illustrate the active delegation framework. Alice needs to render large images by using some rendering services provided by the Grid. A rendering service may also need to get its input data from a database. There is usually more than one site that can host the job and therefore Alice may use the Gridway meta-scheduler for the job submission. Depending on some criteria specified for the meta-scheduler, Gridway chooses one site out of all available sites to run Alice's job. It may also exist more than one replica of input data that the job can use. For this, Alice's job needs to call a Replica Location Service (RLS) provided by GT4 to locate the closest database service which contains a replica of the required input images.
As it is typically used, the GT4 security infrastructure requires Alice to generate a Proxy Certificate (PC) [13] for her job which gives the job full permission for acting on behalf of Alice (impersonating Alice's identity). This does provide dynamism, but does not restrict delegation in any way. Alice could also restrict the PC by embedding policies which restrict the usage of the PC for only an intended task or specific resource access; however, Alice can not anticipate which sites are going to be chosen by the scheduler or which database replica will be selected by the RLS service. Alice therefore needs to delegate to her job the permissions for accessing all the sites and all the databases. The rest of this section describes how the active delegation framework can be leveraged to provide a restricted and still dynamic delegation from Alice to the job.
Alice uses a client program and the Gridway system to submit her job (Step 1a of Figure 2 ). The client program uses a policy template and updates the Rei policy repository with a Rei delegation policy as depicted in Figure 4 ( Step 1b). This can enable delegating more requested permissions to the job by Alice. It may also include any local delegation policy, like the simple one depicted, which implies that a delegation would be valid as long as the job (SimJob) is active. However, delegation can be triggered or activated only if the pre-conditions are fulfilled. In this case it needs to be asserted that SimJob requires additional permissions. The client also asks the Context Manager to initiate a new context and associate that to the SimJob (Step 1c).
Gridway examines different Grid resources to select one to which the simulation job can be submitted. The Context Manager watches the decisions that the Gridway system makes regarding where to submit the job (Step 2). Now the site which <!-SpeechAct delegation--> <action:Delegation rdf:ID="AliceToSimJob"> <action:sender rdf:resource="&inst;Alice"/> <action:receiver rdf:resource="&inst;SimJob"/> <action:content> <deontic:Permission> <deontic:actor rdf:resource="&inst;var1"/> <deontic:action rdf:resource="&inst;var2"/> </deontic:Permission> </action:content> <action:condition rdf:resource="&inst;SimJobIsActive"/> <action:precondition rdf:resource= "&inst;SimJobRequiresPerm"/> </action:Delegation> Fig. 4 . The SpeechAct delegation associated to the SimJob implies that delegation is valid as long as the SimJob is active and delegation can also be triggered only if the pre-conditions are fulfilled-in our scenario, if the SimJob needs to be submitted for execution.
will host the simulation job is determined, though a delegation from Alice is also required for the job to be submitted. The required rights can be requested from the Delegation Service running on behalf of Alice, if the request can be approved by the Delegation Service. Figure 5 shows such request in Rei format. For this, the WS-GRAM makes a delegation request in GrDP format and sends that to the Delegation Service (Step 3). The Delegation Service can approve the request if the Context Manager can assert the need for the requested rights. For this, the Delegation Service makes a query to the Context Manager to obtain the context information for this specific job (Step 4). The Context Manager has already created an associated context, which asserts the "need" (scheduler's decision) for the required rights. It converts the context information into a single internal format (Rei constraints) as depicted in Figure 6 , embeds them in an X.509 certificate, signs it and sends that back to the Delegation Service. The Delegation Service receives the request, verifies the signature and sends the constraints along with a delegation query to the policy engine (Step 5). The policy engine performs reasoning over the delegation policies to decide whether the requested rights can be delegated to the SimJob (Step 6). If there is no conflict with the local delegation policies established by Alice or the administrator, the Delegation Service, according to the delegation request specification generates the requested credential, makes a GrDP response message and sends it back to the WS-GRAM to submit the job (Step 7).
<action:Request rdf:ID="FromSimJobToAlice"> <action:sender rdf:resource="&inst;SimJob"/> <action:receiver rdf:resource="&inst;Alice"/> <action:content rdf:resource="&inst;SubmitJobToPDC"/> </action:Request> <action:Action rdf:ID="SubmitJobToPDC"> <action:target rdf:resource="&inst;GRAM"/> <action:location rdf:resource="&inst;PDC"/> <action:Action> In a multi-site scenario, if the job migrates to another site the delegation SpeechAct depicted in Figure 4 needs to be updated in a way to impose new delegation pre-conditions as depicted in Figure 7 .
<constraint:SimpleConstraint rdf:ID="SimJobRequiresPerm"> <constraint:subject rdf:resource= "&inst;SimJob"/> <constraint:predicate rdf:resource="&inst;Requires"/> <constraint:object rdf:resource="#SimJobTobeSubmittedToPDC"/> </constraint:SimpleConstraint> <constraint:And rdf:ID=''SimJobTobeSubmittedToPDC''> <constraint:first rdf:resource="#PDCSiteIsReady"/> <constraint:second rdf:resource="#NCSASiteIsDown"/> </constraint:And> <constraint:SimpleConstraint rdf:ID="PDCSiteIsReady"> <constraint:subject rdf:resource= "&inst;PDCJobSubmissionService"/> <constraint:predicate rdf:resource="&inst;Status"/> <constraint:object rdf:resource="&inst;Ready"/> </constraint:SimpleConstraint> <constraint:SimpleConstraint rdf:ID="NCSASiteIsDown"> <constraint:subject rdf:resource= "&inst;NCSAJobSubmissionService"/> <constraint:predicate rdf:resource="&inst;Status"/> <constraint:object rdf:resource="&inst;Down"/> </constraint:SimpleConstraint> These constraints specify the conditions (context) upon which delegation is requested for the SimJob. These constraints assert that additional permissions are required to submit SimJob. These also describe that the PDC site has been selected because the NCSA site is down.
<action:precondition> <constraint:And> <constraint:first rdf:resource= "&inst;SimJobRequiresPerm"/> <constraint:second rdf:resource= "&pdcPolicy;SimJobRequiresPerm"/> </constraint:And> </action:precondition> Fig. 7 . Updated pre-conditions of delegation policy with a new constraint after the job submitted to PDC site. This will further force the job to assert the need for additional rights when acting on behalf of Alice in domain PDC.
IV. RELATED WORKS
We now describe relevant related work in two areas: Grid delegation and active security models. UNICORE 4 , which is one of the widely used Grid infrastructures, addresses delegation and multi-site job execution by creating Sub-AJOs from a parent Abstract Job Object (AJO). In this approach, all components of an AJO are signed with the end-user's certificate at creation time, granting a limited set of rights to the specific job. This implies a secure but static delegation mechanism. "Explicit Trust Delegation" proposed in [14] is aimed to address this shortcoming by introducing trusted agents that are allowed to create and sign AJOs on behalf of end-users. By this approach end-users need to trust other agents for endorsing Sub-AJOs on their behalf and if a job runs on an untrusted site, execution fails. Moreover endusers loose their control on Sub-AJOs during the execution of task. Scalability also is an issue in this approach. In order to ensure that an endorser is authorized to endorse a Sub-AJO on behalf of the end-user, information for each end-user must be coded explicitly in an authorization database at each site.
The Globus Security Infrastructure (GSI) implements delegation by means of "proxy certificates", which can provide full impersonation of end-users by granting all rights to a subordinate. This provides a dynamic delegation mechanism, as there is no need to know the details of the execution in advance. However, this exposes all of the user's rights to possible compromise. Issuing short-lived proxy certificates is one solution for limiting the danger caused by unauthorized acquisition or usage of a proxy identity. Another approach is to use the PCI extension to carry a policy statement that limits the delegated rights [15] .
The Community Authorization Service (CAS) [16] is a third-party, trusted by resource owners and used by end-users to obtain rights to access resources. It issues credentials, which limit the rights of the holder to only those agreed on between the virtual organization (VO) and the resource providers, using PCI extensions. The Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS) [17] grants authorization data to users at the VO level by providing support for group membership, roles and capabilities. Although CAS and VOMS allow users to obtain and delegate specific rights via tags and roles during a session, they do not address the need for dynamic, on-demand delegation, considering that it is often difficult to determine the rights needed by a Grid job in advance. They do not either provide support for contexts as an essential factor in fulfilling the requirements of the least privilege principle in highly dynamic environments like Grids.
Currently GSI uses identity credentials with gridmap-files, a kind of ACL (access control list), in its authorization system. However, emerging works like Akenti [18] , PERMIS [19] and, PRIMA [20] have been aimed at providing support for policy-based authorization system in GSI. Akenti and PER-MIS provide a distributed policy-based authorization system. Akenti designed for Grid environments using attribute certificates and delegated authorization. PERMIS also uses X.509 attribute certificates to hold roles/attributes and currently is fully integrated into Globus GT4 authorization framework. Privilege Management and Authorization system (PRIMA) embeds authorization credentials in GSI proxy certificate to enable transport of authorizations in GSI. PRIMA can also embed XACML [21] privilege statements in GSI proxy credentials to be compared with XACML resource policies in PRIMA access control engine.
Delegation Issuing Service (DIS) [4] is a service that issues X.509 Attribute Certificates (AC) on behalf of an Attribute Authority (typically a manager), integrated into the PERMIS authorization infrastructure. DIS only issue Attribute Certificates and lacks a standard protocol for interactions with an Attribute Authority who requests to issue ACs. It still needs a human to decide what is the least set of privileges to delegate to another entity and there is no support for an automated logic that can determine what are the least privileges to delegate.
The notation of context and active security system are observed in many works. In some of them diverse delegation models are also supported. However, as far as we are aware, the delegation concept in those works has not been investigated from the perspective of our own work presented in this paper. Most of the works in this context are based on the RBAC96 family [22] , which supports role activation within sessions to provide an active model of authorization management and access control models, such as the TeaM-based Access Control (TMAC) model, which is introduced in [23] and extended in [24] to a family of context aware access control models. TMAC basically recognizes the importance of context information for just-in-time activation of permissions. Similar to the TMAC approach, the Task-Base Access Control (TBAC) model [25] is also used for management of authorizations that encapsulate a group of permissions, in a way that they are turned-on only in a just-in-time fashion and synchronized with the processing of authorizations in progressing tasks. The OASIS RBAC model [26] is also an extension to the rolebased access control architecture. OASIS RBAC does not use role delegation but instead defines the notion of appointment. One could consider applying our work to these systems by employing an active security model to determine when a team or session needs to be created or a new member needs to be joined into an established context (team).
None of above approaches addresses all the requirements of delegation described earlier. For the works around active security systems, although they provide support for contexts, they lack the ability to determine the "need" for establishing contexts "dynamically", which is an essential requirement for highly dynamic environments like Grids. This is where we introduce the Context Manager as an architectural component. We also recognize a very special requirement of Grid delegation when we distinguish the constraints applied at authorization time from the constraints applied at delegation time. The former implies that a delegation must be valid as long as the conditions are fulfilled, while the latter specifies that a delegation can be activated only when a set of preconditions are met. This is where we extend the Rei policy language to incorporate "pre-conditions" in the delegation SpeechAct as described in section III-A.1. What distinguishes our work from others is the adaptation of the active delegation model to Grids and providing a supporting framework which can be integrated into current Grid systems and leveraged by existing security mechanisms. Our framework further provides more support for observing and auditing the delegation process adapted to the dynamic requirements of Grid applications.
One part of our approach, which provides an on-demand provisioning of delegated credentials, is in some ways similar to the more general notion of trust negotiation [27] . In trust negotiation, two strangers carry out a bilateral and iterative exchange of attribute credentials to gradually establish trust in one another. Our approach complements trust negotiation in that our work could be used in a system employing trust negotiation to determine when sensitive attribute certificates of a user should be accessible to his jobs.
V. DISCUSSION
What a just-in-time and active delegation mechanism provides is an efficient approach for performing restricted delegation in a dynamic and automated fashion, because in practice we expect a small number of credentials to be required. We address the important concern of scalability by distributing Delegation Services and Context Managers across the Grid, associated with different resources. Delegatees should need to query only a few Delegation Services in practice. Delegation Services need only know about local policies. This provides manageability by providing local policy control points (the Delegation Service). Establishing contexts by the Context Managers can help Delegation Services to adequately perform decision making even in highly changing environments with dynamic execution paths. By using call-backs, our delegation framework never leaves a job stranded without credentials, but policy dictates the least privilege credentials that are delegated. When a job needs credentials that policy won't allow, we can put the job "on hold", notify the user, and wait for user intervention. If the user approves, the job can then proceed, thereby providing a very effective approach compared to other delegation mechanisms.
The active delegation mechanism is not actually aimed at replacing any existing delegation mechanisms mentioned in section IV. The concept and the framework are rather modeled and designed to be used to improve and complement the delegation mechanism used by existing security systems, such as GSI. The mechanism provided by this work does not either mandate a Grid system to use any particular authorization system: it can be leveraged by any existing authorization system used by Grids to provide a dynamic and restricted delegation mechanism. The framework is also not limited only to use a particular scheduler or particular information service for collecting information and establishing contexts. It is rather open to use any other source of information (Grid information services) like the native Grid services provided by GT4 environments or other Grid middlewares.
Trust is an important issue in this framework. The Delegation Service has to establish a trust relationship with the Context Manager. That is, the Delegation Service needs to ensure the authenticity of the Context Manager and the integrity of context information. GSI provides mature support for authentication and integrity checking through digital signatures. The context information collected and represented by the Context Manager should also be trusted. This information is used to assert a delegation request and therefore crucial for trustworthy policy evaluation. Trust establishment is transitive in this case, as trusting the Context Manager implies trusting the information services like the Gridway system and other source of information.
This approach has benefits of real-time control and auditing at the Delegation Service. However, it may hurt performance if it requires multiple callbacks to the Delegation Service for obtaining rights. In this regard, one strategy to optimize delegation would be delegating more rights to the job either at the time of launching or during each callback, so that a Delegatee does not have to callback to a Delegation Service so often. Determining this set of rights in an optimal way is a challenging issue that can be considered part of the future work of this research.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we described new requirements imposed by Grid systems for providing an agile, automated and restricted delegation mechanism. We introduced the notation of an active delegation (just-in-time) model to address the issue. We described an active delegation model as a context-based approach which supports a call-back mechanism for provisioning ondemand and restricted delegation credentials. We described how by leveraging this approach permissions could be given to the Delegatees on request, just-in-time and only for an intended task. We described the architectural components of our proposed framework and how to deploy this framework in a GT4 based Grid environment. We made use of Rei, a contextbased policy framework to express and deploy delegation policies. We also used GrDP, a credential exchanging protocol with support for the WS-Trust interface for requesting and receiving delegation credentials. We described a proof-ofconcept implementation of our proposed delegation framework with a use case scenario for job submission in a GT4 based Grid system.
The active delegation framework has the potential to be integrated into other Grid systems and middlewares. Therefore as future work we plan to investigate how to use the active delegation model in some other Grid systems like UNICORE, gLite 5 and NAREGI 6 . We also described Rei and its potential to express just-in-time delegation in the active delegation framework. However we believe that any other policy language which incorporates the concept of contexts and provides support for delegation can also be used to describe active delegation policies as well. Therefore, one future work would be investigating how to use other policy languages in this framework. One alternative would be XACML, a standard and general purpose policy system designed to support the needs of modern authorization system.
